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In section 304 of the Investigations (1973), Wittgenstein 
responds to his interlocutor who asks him “But you will 
surely admit that there is a difference between pain-
behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour with-
out any pain? (…) And yet you again and again reach the 
conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing”. The 
charge is that our basic qualitative sensory states such as 
the ones present when we have pain are irrelevant and 
can be dismissed – it is as if they were not present. One 
could read Wittgenstein’s interlocutor to be pressing him to 
endorse the denial of qualia. “Qualia” is a frequently used 
expression to refer to basic qualitative sensory states. 
Wittgenstein, however, responds that it is as if they were 
not present, but still there is something present. He writes: 
“Not at all. It is not a something, but it is not a nothing ei-
ther! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve 
just as well as a something about which nothing can be 
said.” Wittgenstein then refuses the charge of denying 
qualia. He is rather hinting at a way to understand qualia. 
Or so we argue in this work. 
We believe Wittgenstein considers qualia to be 
something like tropes. Tropes are abstract particulars1. 
The friend of tropes shares the nominalist dislike of univer-
sals (and, typically, of properties). There could be one-
place or many-places tropes; the former are sometimes 
called qualitons and the latter relatons. Instead of proper-
ties, trope theory takes every predication to involve particu-
larity; 'x is a book' doesn’t predicate the same property as 
‘y is a book’ – our predicate ‘book’ does no more than 
point at some relevant similarity between x and y; it names 
no property.  The green of a leaf of grass is not the same 
as the green of another leaf – only they can be relevantly 
similar, similar enough to be under the same predication.  
We hold that qualia can be seen as qualitons, and 
not as (universal) properties of a mental state (such as 
pain, for example). Further, we are convinced that Witt-
genstein hints in this direction. Hacker’s comments (1993) 
on section 304 of the Investigations suggest that what 
Wittgenstein "is doing is rejecting the grammar of name 
and object". Having a pain is not like to having a penny. 
So, pain is not concrete. Also, it does not make sense to 
say that we have now the same pain we have had yester-
day. So, pain is not a universal. These together suggest 
that pain is an abstract particular. At the same time, a sen-
sation is not a nothing, as it’s not the absence of anything. 
It is nothing only in the sense that it cannot be used un-
aided in predications. We will try to make this clearer and 
elaborate further on the view by considering bits of his 
Lecture notes on “Private experience” and “Sense data” 
(1968). 
Wittgenstein writes: 
“What if someone asked: "How do I know that what I call 
seeing red isn’t an entirely different experience every 
time?”” (p. 279).  
The friends of tropes would then reply: Why do we need 
them to be the same? Isn’t enough that we use the same 
word for what is red? Red doesn’t need to be the name of 
a sensation.  
And Wittgenstein: 
“We say here that a name is given to a particular im-
pression. And this is strange and puzzling. For it seems 
as though the impression were too ethereal to be named 
(Marrying a woman’s wealth).” (p. 275). 
It sort of escapes us until we grab it with a concept. It is as 
if there is nothing to be known until we find the resources 
to express it. In order for me to know I have a pain I need 
to speak English, otherwise I don’t know what to do with 
the particular sensation I have. When I learn a language, I 
learn to use my qualiton as a qualitative indication of me 
having a pain or me sensing something red. Such a quali-
tative indication works only when I am familiar with the 
rules that govern the use of ‘red’ or ‘pain’ in English. 
“What could be meant by: truthfully calling a color im-
pression ‘red’? Does the word fit one impression better 
than another?” (p. 295). Further, “[i]f I say ‘I see red’ 
without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it 
with truth and saying it as a lie?” (p. 294).  
The expression of an impression is only true or false with 
respect to rules for concepts, with respect to usage in a 
public language. If there is no independent stance of 
judgment, my expression that I see red can always be a 
lie. It’s me alone with my qualiton. A trope, seen as a 
quale, is private. There is nothing in a trope that makes it 
fit a word better than any other. Tropes have no name – 
they are particulars, they are re-identified only when they 
are clustered together by our sensory vocabulary. Sensa-
tions are red or green, qualia (as qualitons) could be any-
thing provided that we acquire the relevant concepts and, 
with them, the relevant patterns of similarity. 
“But we are under the impression that we can point to 
the pain, as it were unseen by the other person, and 
name it.” (p. 276) 
We can point at the pain, but not at the qualiton. When we 
point at the pain, we are pointing and naming a state that 
is identified through different indicators. The trope is the 
subjective and qualitative indicator. The same trope could 
indicate something very different. Qualia are enabling con-
ditions for concept acquisition; a given qualiton is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for any concept to be acquired. 
What we mean with our words for sensations is not some-
thing of our own. Only the qualiton is private, but we don’t 
talk about it. 
“The difficulty is that we feel we have said something 
about the nature of pain when we say that one person 
can't have another person’s pain.” (p. 277) 
We assume every pain is associated with a sensation – 
with a quale. Without qualia, we would hesitate to call it a 
pain. Yet, we can be easily fooled by pain-behaviour. As 




you wrote in the Investigations (257), we could not learn 
what is meant by pain by attending solely to our qualia.  
“Now whom shall we call blind? What is our criterion for 
blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if the person 
behaves in that particular way, we not only call him blind 
but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his 
behavior also determines the meaning of blindness for 
him. But now you will say: “surely blindness isn’t a be-
havior; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man 
and not be blind. Therefore 'blindness' means some-
thing different; his behavior only helps him to under-
stand what we mean by ‘blindness.’ The outward cir-
cumstances are what both he and we know. Whenever 
he behaves in a certain way, we say that he sees noth-
ing; but he notices that a certain private experience of 
his coincides with all these cases and so concludes that 
we mean this experience of his by saying that he sees 
nothing." (p. 285) 
Yes, a blind person is detected through behavior. The 
qualitons of a blind person could not be suitably exploited 
to provide the behavior we would identify as seeing. Of 
course there is a physiological counterpart to blindness, 
but the physiological tests are designed to make sense of 
our common sense idea of what is blindness.2 We assume 
also that there is a quale associated to blindness even if 
we cannot access it. We are constantly under the impres-
sion that we are naming brute sensations and not a com-
plex of sensations and behaviors when we use expres-
sions like blindness (or color-blindness, or red-blindness). 
“As it were: There is something further about it, only you 
can't say it; you can only make the general statement. It 
is this idea which plays hell with us.” (p. 276) 
Indeed, we feel compelled to say that there is a quale (a 
qualiton) corresponding to each occurrence of, say, pain. 
We talk of pain in general, but there is a particular indicator 
of pain in each case – and we learn to see them as rele-
vantly similar.  We exploit the qualitons available to us 
when we are learning our sensory vocabulary. 
I wonder “[h]ow can we point to the color and not to the 
shape? Or to the feeling of toothache and not to the 
tooth, etc?” (p. 276) 
That reminds me of a case Noodhof (1998) considers.  A 
glass is shattered as a result of a soprano singing a note. 
It seems tempting to say that it is the pitch and not the 
meaning of the singing that caused the shattering.  Simi-
larly, my feeling of pain (and not the activation of my C-
fibers) is what makes me scream. It is in virtue of the pain 
that I scream. Gozzano (2008), for one, holds that tropes 
ought to be simples, that is, they must be maximally de-
terminate. If this is so, there should be a pitch-trope and a 
meaning-trope. Similarly, when considering a causal proc-
ess that could lead to the acquisition of two different con-
cepts (say, tooth and toothache), one should posit two and 
not just one quale. The claim is that if a trope is a simple, it 
cannot carry two causal powers. Robb (1997), on the other 
hand, holds that causal powers are connected to particu-
lars – it is a particular trope that causes the (particular) 
shattering of the glass. While it could be that it is better to 
describe the trope as having a high pitch – each trope has 
several similarity relations with other tropes – it is the trope 
qua trope that causes the shattering. Similarly, it is the 
trope qua trope that is part of the causal story we want to 
tell about learning the concept of toothache. Of course,  
 
in this case we have troubles individuating qualitons. How-
ever, the relevant causal powers are to be found not only 
in qualia but also on the language learning context around 
the process. If this is so, a single trope can be part of 
causal processes of concept acquisition for several differ-
ent concepts. Qualitons can even have relations of similar-
ity among them independently of their role in our vocabu-
lary learning, but these relations play no role in our capac-
ity to identify sensations. Learning a language involves 
learning a way to exploit our qualia. 
We propose to see qualia as abstract particulars, to 
be exploited in our process of language acquisition. In that 
process, we cluster qualia together when we learn similar-
ity relations. Our view is therefore one where similarity 
relations are crucial for the acquisition of concepts. One 
could, however, fear that judgments of similarity cannot get 
off the ground if all they have to start out with are mere 
abstract particulars. Suppose one is learning a sensory 
concept like ‘red’ or ‘bitter’ and has to acquire the relevant 
similarity relations among her qualia. If one has the quale 
Q and is taught that it resembles quale R, but not quale P, 
how could one compare those qualia without having them 
somehow present in the mind? In other words, how can my 
past qualia be retrieved when I need them in order to learn 
similarity relations if they are not (from the beginning) 
available in a conceptual format? The question resembles 
the one Wittgenstein poses at section 342 at the Investiga-
tions (1973): how can a deaf-mute person recall thoughts 
she had before she was introduced to any language, writ-
ten or otherwise? This is a troublesome area, but we be-
lieve we can sketch a way out. 
Consider one’s attention to quale Q. We assume at-
tention is somehow different from predication – I can at-
tend to Q without making a predication of the sort ‘Q is φ’ 
(note that the abstract particular is the subject of the pos-
sible predication). If I can attend to Q, then we can have it 
present to the mind, at least sometimes, together with P or 
R. Notice that this procedure of attention can be thor-
oughly private and subjective – as it can differ completely 
from one to another person. Still, we believe this privacy is 
both enough to make sure that qualia as qualitons are 
useful for concept acquisition and does not violate the 
kernel of the assault on the given. All that is required is 
that we can manage to attend to two qualitons at the same 
time so that we can start to grasp the notions of similarity 
and relevant difference. This should be eventually enough 
to get the process off the ground – a process of gradual 
refinement of concepts so that what is roughly red eventu-
ally gets refined into different shades of red. 
We would like to finish in a less heroic tone. We as-
sume that we can attend to more than one qualiton at a 
time (and register similarities in a rudimentary way) inde-
pendently of our introduction to a public language. We take 
this to be a plausible assumption. If we are not entitled to 
make this assumption, maybe the account of qualia as 
abstract particulars loses some of its attraction. In any 
case, there is an interesting lesson to be learned: any talk 
of qualia that ascribes to them an explanatory role comes 
together with some commitments concerning privacy. 
Endnotes 
1 Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990) are seminal articles on tropes. 2 Cf. 
Sacks (1996) on cases of blindsight. 
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